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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Theft, a third 
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of Utah, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, presiding. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RONALD L. BOREN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930275-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Ronald Boren relies on his opening brief and also 
refers to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, the issues, 
the case, and the facts. He replies to the State's brief as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Theft requires proof of a "permanent" intent to deprive. 
This essential mens rea element, however, was excluded from the jury 
instructions. The theft conviction improperly rested on the less 
culpable showing of a "temporary" intent. 
The jury instructions also allowed the jury to simply 
presume that Mr. Boren possessed a criminal intent when the State 
presented nothing more than a predicate fact. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INSTRUCTIONS PREVENTED THE JURY FROM DISTINGUISHING 
BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF INTENT 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
In its brief, the State argues that since "[j]ury 
Instruction 9 tracked Utah Code Ann. § 76-[6]-404 (1990) 
verbatim[, ]fl there was no error. Appellee's brief, Point I.B. 
However, such verbatim tracking proved erroneous in the case at bar 
because the statute (and Instruction 9 both) failed to distinguish 
between the "permanent" intent required for theft, and the 
"temporary" intent contained in the lesser offenses.1 See Opening 
brief of Mr. Boren, Point I. The distinction was critical. State 
v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added) (trial court 
committed reversible error for giving an instruction which purported 
to state the essential elements of the crime, "but fail[ed] to 
expressly include the element that the defendant must be found to 
have intended to permanently deprive the owner of possession of the 
automobile"). 
Due to the lower court's denial of Mr. Boren's requested 
instruction, (R 383-84), proof of a "temporary" intent was all that 
the State needed to establish a theft. See (R 195); Opening brief 
of Mr. Boren, Addendum D. Since the jury did not have to find a 
1. Furthermore, the differences in intent subjected Ronald 
Boren to a far greater penalty and potential period of incarceration. 
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (theft, a second degree felony, 
carries a potential 1-15 year prison term), with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-la-1311(l) unauthorized control over a motor vehicle is a 
class A misdemeanor with no prison term). 
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"permanent" intent for the greater offense, the defective 
instructions relieved the State of its burden of proof. 
On a related point, the State contends, "Defendant's 
requested addition of the word 'permanently' restricts the crime of 
theft to only one of three statutory definitions and is therefore, a 
misstatement of the law." Appellee's brief, Point I.e. According 
to the State, "permanently" applies only to subsection (a) while a 
less culpable mental state suffices for subsections (b) and (c). 
Appellee's brief, page 7; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(3)(a)-(c). 
Contrary to its claims, a theft conviction may not rest 
simultaneously upon proof of a "permanent" intent and upon proof of 
a "temporary" intent.2 Such an interpretation illustrates precisely 
how the jury was misled on the requisite intent. Even under 
alternative subsections, the crime of theft cannot encompass such 
drastically different mental states particularly when lesser 
offenses were at issue. 
The clear mandate from the instructions prevented the jury 
from considering the lesser offenses. See (R 195-96) (Instructions 
11 & 12). Those offenses were not to be considered unless the jury 
had initially found "the accused 'not guilty' of the greater offense 
[theft] as charged in the information and defined in these 
instructions[.]" (R 195-96). That mandate, together with the 
ill-defined greater offense instruction, deprived the jury of the 
2. However, proof of a less permanent intent (i.e. a 
temporary intent to deprive) may have addressed other included 
crimes—lesser offenses which the jury was unable to consider. 
(R 196-99). 
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ability to even focus on the appropriate intent. In short, the jury 
did not have the opportunity to consider Mr. Boren's theory of the 
case and to "[reject] [the] lesser included charges. . ." See 
Appellee's brief, page 8. 
POINT II 
THE INSTRUCTIONS IMPROPERLY ALLOWED THE JURY TO 
PRESUME INTENT ON NOTHING MORE THAN A PREDICATE FACT 
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief) 
The State correctly notes that "none of the instructions in 
this case contained [the] impermissible language [contained in other 
cases.]" Appellee's brief, page 9. However, while the wording here 
is slightly different, the unconstitutional presumption still 
remains. For example, even though the involved wording in State v. 
Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985), and State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 
452 (Utah 1987), did not mirror the contested language of leading 
United States Supreme Court decisions, our state supreme court 
nonetheless recognized the unfairness of similarly phrased 
instructions. See Opening brief of Mr. Boren, pages 14-15; see also 
State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Utah App. 1991) (citation 
omitted) (substance over form is the pertinent inquiry). 
The instructions given in Mr. Boren's trial only required 
the jury to determine whether the property would be restored "upon 
payment of a reward or other compensation[.]" (R 194). Once the 
State presented such evidence, the instructions allowed the jury to 
simply presume a criminal intent. Rather than being left with the 
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opportunity to possibly infer intent,3 the instructions instead 
limited the extent of the jury's deliberations. Unless Boren proved 
otherwise, his hope for compensation was presumptively equated to a 
"purpose to deprive." Mere evidence of this predicate fact "meant" 
a purpose to deprive. (R 194).4 The instructions relieved the 
State of its burden of proof. 
The improper shifting of the burden is not saved by the 
"conscious objective" language emphasized by the State. See 
Appellee's brief, pages 9-11. A "purpose to deprive" may constitute 
either a conscious objective to "temporarily" deprive or a conscious 
objective to "permanently" deprive. Besides the flawed nature of 
3. As previously explained in State v. Robichaux, 639 P.2d 
207 (Utah 1981): 
Given the high standard of proof in a criminal case, 
and the relative burdens on the prosecution and the 
defense, the jury should, at most, be told that it 
may, on the basis of all the evidence, including the 
inference that people usually intend the natural 
consequences of their acts, find that the defendant 
intended the natural consequences of his act. Had 
that been the case, the jury would have had to 
consciously make a finding as to whether the 
prosecution had proved the requisite intent. But 
under the instructions given, that intent was at least 
initially established as a matter of law, and the 
burden of persuasion, in the jury's mind, may well 
have been shifted to the defendant. 
Id. at 210 (Hall, C.J.) (emphasis in original). 
4. Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517 (1979) ("a 
reasonable jury could well have interpreted the presumption as 
'conclusive,7 that is, not technically as a presumption at all, but 
rather as an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once 
convinced of the facts triggering the presumption"). 
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the mens rea definition, see supra Point I., the "conscious 
objective" language still saddled Mr, Boren with the burden of 
proving the applicability of a less culpable mental state. 
When the instructions are read as a whole, they failed to 
allow the jury to consider Boren's theory of the case and they 
created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. The trial court 
erred in refusing to properly instruct the jury. 
CONCLDSION 
Mr. Boren respectfully requests this Court to reverse his 
conviction and to remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this /?££ day of December, 1993. 
RONALD S.VFU^INO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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